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274 BROKAW v. BLACK-FOXE MILITARY INSTITUTE [37 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 21508. In Bank. May 25, 1951.] 
ROBER 'I' BROKAW, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents, v. 
BLACK-FOXE MILITARY INSTITUTE et al., Defend-
ants; HOLLYWOOD COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS, 
INCORPORATED (a Corporation), Appellant. 
~ 
[1] Schools-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Evidence.-A finding 
that an automobile driver was acting as a school's agent and 
within his authority when his student passenger was injured 
en route to the driver's home is sustained by evidence that 
the driver, a part-time employee of the school who often took 
students on scheduled out?ngs, on learning the student had not 
gone with the others on one of these outings, secured permis-
sion of the officer in charge before proceeding to take the 
student to the driver's home and then to the destination of 
the outing. 
[2] Agency-Questions of Fact.-Existence of agency is generally 
a question of fact to be determined on consideration of all the 
evidence rather than on any specific testimony as to the fact 
of agency, and a finding of agency will not be disturbed 
merely because evidence justifies an inference to the contrary. 
[3] Automobiles-Evidence-Negligence of Operator.-An auto-
mobile driver's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout 
or in following a vehicle too closely, and its causal connection 
with a passenger's injury, may properly be inferred from evi-
dence that he was talking to passengers when a truck several 
car lengths ahead stopped and that he ran into the truck 
because he was traveling too fast to stop. 
[4a, 4b] Trial-V.erdict-Two Defendants-Verdict Silent as to 
One.-A verdict against one of two defendants but silent as 
to the other is not a verdict in favor of such other unless 
instructions show a contrary meaning, but is merely a failure 
to find on all the issues. 
[5] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Verdict.-
In an action against several defendants, including a master 
and servant, failure to return a verdict as to the servant while 
rendering one against the master does not exonerate the 
servant so as to relieve the master of liability based on 
respondeat sttperior, but is merely an incomplete verdict. 
[2] See 1 Cal.Jur. 696, 865; 2 Am.Jur. 359. 
[ 4] See 24 Cal.Jur. 880; 53 Am.Jur. 719. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Schools, § 74; [2] Agency, §§ 231, 
235(4); [3] Automobiles,§ 215; [4] Trial, § 221; [5] Master and 
Servant, § 217; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1166, 1185; [7] Schools, 
§ 75; [8] Trial,§ 225. 
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[6] Appeal-Presumptions-Instructions and Verdict.-An appel-
late court will presume that instructions and forms of verdict 
given to the jury, but not in the record were proper, and that 
under the issues a proper verdict was returned, notwithstand-
ing it is silent as to one of several defendants. 
[7a, 7b] Schools-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Verdict.-Where 
a student through his mother as guardian b'rough'.:. an action 
against his school and its employee for injuries sustained by 
him, while a passenger, through the alleged negligent operation 
of an automobile by such employee in the course of his 
employment, and the student and his mother in her individual 
capacity brought another action against the school only for 
injuries sustained through its negligence in permitting the 
student to leave the school grounds, a verdict for both the 
student and his mother against the school only will be sus-
tained as based· on the negligence of the employee in the 
operation of the automobile imputed to the school under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, notwithstanding the verdict 
is silent as to the employee, especially where propriety of the 
verdict was affirmed on motion for a new trial, and where, the 
instructions and forms of verdict being absent from the record 
and the mother having sought medical expenses in both actions, 
it may reasonably be concluded that the jury failed to dis-
tinguish between her positions in the two actions. 
[8] Trial-Verdict-Objections-Waiver.-In the absence of an 
objection as to the form of a verdict, its failure to segregate 
the amount awarded a mother, as guardian, for her son's 
medical expenses from that awarded him for injuries is 
waived. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thomas J. Cunningham, Judge. Affirmed. 
Actions for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
plaintiffs against one defendant, affirmed. 
Tripp & Callaway mid Hulen C. Callaway for Appellant. 
Robert J. Sullivan and Lewis L. Clarke, Jr., for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant Hollywood Commercial Build-
ings, Incorporated, doing business as Black-Foxe Military In-
stitute (hereinafter termed the school), appeals from a judg-
ment on a jury verdict assessing damages against it for per-
sonal injuries suffered by a student of the school. 
The injuries arose out of a collision which occurred off the 
school grounds between an automobile driven by one Elvin 
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Martin, in which the student was riding, and a truck. Two 
related but separate actions were filed and were consolidated 
for trial. The first action, brought by the student, Robert 
Brokaw, a minor, through his guardian ad litem, was based 
on a charge of negligent driving, and named as defendants, 
the driver of the truck, the driver of the automobile, the owner 
of the automobile, and (on a master-servant theory) the school. 
In the second action, the student (by his guardian ad litem) 
and his mother sued the school on the theory of negligence 
in allowing the student to leave the school premises, or negli-
gent failure to supervise. A motion for nonsuit was granted 
in favor of the truck driver, without objection by plaintiffs. 
The jury made a special finding that Martin, the driver of 
the automobile in which the student was riding, was acting 
as agent of the school and in the course and scope of his au-
thority at the time of the accident. A consolidated (single) 
verdict for $10,000 against the school was rendered in favor 
of the student and his mother. No verdict was rendered either 
for or against Martin. As ground for reversal the school 
(hereinafter sometimes termed defendant) urges that the evi-
dence wholly fails to support a finding that any negligence 
chargeable to it contributed proximately to the student's in-
juries. It urges that it was not negligent in permitting Rob-
ert to leave the school grounds with Martin, and that if it 
was, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. That contention need not be discussed as we believe 
the judgment may be supported on the theory that Robert 
was injured as the result of Martin's negligence in the opera-
tion of the car and that he was acting within the scope of his 
employment by the school at the time of the accident. In that 
connection it is asserted that Martin was not negligent and 
he was not the agent of the school. 
It was an established practice of the school to conduct 
organized outings on Saturdays for the boys, which they were 
free to attend or not, as they wished. The boys did not pay a 
special transportation charge for the school's station wagons 
ordinarily used on the outings, but did have to pay for any 
amusements or refreshments from their own spending money. 
Martin was a young college student just under 21 years of age 
who worked part time at the school; one of his duties was to 
take the students on certain of the Saturday outings. He also 
acted as teacher and counselor, and as dormitory and athletic 
supervisor. .On the Saturday of the accident he had been 
off duty, but shortly before noon had come to the school in 
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an automobile owned by his father to pick up some belongings. 
On that day Robert and certain other boys had not gone on 
the school's regular organized outing to Long Beach because 
they lacked spending money. When Martin learned of this 
he offered to lend them spending money, take them to his 
mother's home in Whittier for lunch, and then take them to 
Long Beach to join the other boys. They went with Martin 
to the officer in charge, who was the only person authorized 
under the school rules to permit them to leave the school 
grounds, and secured permission to go with Martin by the 
specified route. The boys did not pay Martin for their trans-
portation and did not discuss the matter. En route to Whit-
tier in the automobile owned by Martin's father the collision 
took place. 
[1] Turning to the school's contention that the evidence 
does not support the jury finding· that Martin was the school's 
agent at the time of the collision, it appears that Lt. Redmond 
was in charge at the school when the request was made of him 
by Martin and the boys that the boys be permitted to go with 
Martin to his home and then to the place of the regular Sat-
urday outing. Redmond testified that he was the officer in 
charge on that day; that a young student like Robert is not 
allowed to leave the grounds unless he is ''in the charge of a 
responsible person"; as to what transpired when the arrange-
ment was made with Martin he said: ''I know Mr. Martin 
said something about it to me and mentioned he was going 
to his mother's at Whittier and have lunch, and was from there 
going to Long Beach and would have the children back that 
evening. I am not too positive, but I am quite sure that 
I did request him to be back by 8 :00 o'clock or before because 
they were leaving in the morning. I felt a day's outing was 
sufficient without staying out too late." He knew Martin 
as a colleague at the school. There had been a regular sched-
uled trip for the boys that day for an ''outing.'' Although 
Martin did not take the boys on the instant Saturday outing, 
it was one of his duties on every other Saturday. The fore-
going is sufficient from which the jury could have inferred 
that Martin was the agent of the school in taking the boys 
on that occasion. True, it was not a regular scheduled out-
ing, but it was in lieu thereof. When Redmond permitted 
Martin to take the boys it may be inferred, he being an 
instructor at the school, that he was authorized as such em-
ployee to do so. The school refers to testimony that the trip 
had no connection with the school activities (probably the 
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conclusion of the witnesses) ; that he received no pay for it; 
that he was not on duty at the time; that he was on a trip of 
his own; that he was driving his own car, and the like. That 
creates nothing more than a conflict in the evidence. [2] While 
it may be that an inference might flow therefrom that Martin 
was acting merely as a matter of accommodation, that does 
not require a reversal, as the existence of agency is generally 
a question of fact, and ''whether he was such agent was an 
issue sharply contested at the trial, and was to be determined 
by the court upon a consideration of the entire evidence re-
specting the course pursued by him during the negotiations, 
rather than upon any specific testimony by him or by the 
defendant as to the fact of agency; and the inference which 
the trial court might reasonably make from such evidence is 
entitled to the same consideration as its finding of a fact upon 
contradictory evidence." (Willey v. Clements, 146 Cal. 91 
96 [79 P. 850] .) (See, also, Ferroni v. Pacific Finance Corp., 
21 Cal.2d 773 [135 P.2d 569]; 1 Cal.Jur., 696-7, 865.) Hath-
away v. Siskiyou etc. School Dist., 66 Cal.App.2d 103 [151 
P.2d 861], cited by the school is clearly distinguishable. There 
the issue was whether a school pupil was the agent of the 
school, when by permission of the school principal, she was 
absent from school to advertise a nonschool carnival. Here 
Martin was an employee of the school and it was in general 
line of duty to take boys on outings and he was authorized 
to take them on the fateful trip. 
[3] There is substantial evidence of Martin's negligence 
in driving the car, and that such negligence was a proximate 
cause of the accident. Cruz A. Uribe was driving a truck 
upgrade east on Fourth Street, in Los Angeles, at 20 miles 
per hour. The engine was missing and he pulled next to the 
curb in the extreme right lane and drove half the length of 
his truck off of Fourth Street through an opening in the curb 
and stopped. Martin was also driving east on Fourth Street 
in the same traffic lane to the rear of the truck. According to 
Martin, he was travelling 25 to 30 miles per hour, and the 
truck was going slower and stopped when Martin's car was 
several car lengths behind it. Martin's car ran into the truck. 
He admitted that he was going too fast to stop. While he was 
approaching the truck he was explaining and pointing out 
to the boys a bridge which was there being constructed and 
telling them to look at it. There is evidence that Martin's car 
did nQt slow down prior to the impact. The jury could have 
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concluded that Martin was not keeping a proper lookout 
ahead or was travelling too closely behind the truck. 
[4a] It is claimed that the jury exonerated Martin, and 
therefore, the verdict against the school cannot stand, as its 
liability must rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
(See Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 [97 P. 875, 129 Am.St. 
Rep. 171]; Pimple v. Southern Pac. Co., 38 Cal.App. 727 
[177 P. 871].) It does not appear, however, that there was a 
verdict for Martin. The jury's verdict was for Robert and 
his mother and against the school. That is tantamount to no 
verdict with respect to Martin. [5] It may occur, as it did 
here, that in an action against several defendants, including 
a master and his servant, the jury may return a verdict 
against the master and remain silent as to the servant. In 
such a case the failure to :find as to the servant is not an exon-
eration of him, thus relieving the master of liability where the 
cause of action is based upon the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior. It is merely an incomplete verdict in that it fails to 
dispose of the liability of all of the parties defendant. [4b] In 
this connection, it is said in Irelan-Yuba etc. Min. Co. v. 
Pacific G. &; E., 18 Cal.2d 557, 570 [116 P.2d 611]: "It is 
well settled that a verdict against one of two defendants but 
which is silent as to the other defendant is not a verdict in 
favor of the latter but is merely a failure on the part of the 
jury to :find upon all of the issues.'' That has been held to 
be the rule in many cases. (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 104] ; Benson v. Southern Pac. Co., 
177 Cal. 777 [171 P. 948]; Rankin v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 
73 Cal. 93 [15 P. 57]; Benjamin v. Stewart, 61 Cal. 605; Lloyd 
v. Boulevard Express, 79 Cal.App. 406 [249 P. 837]; Keller 
v. Smith, 130 Cal.App. 128 [19 P.2d 541] ; Broome v. Kern 
Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal.App.2d 256 [ 44 P.2d 430).) 
It is suggested, however, that the above rule is subject 
to the quali:fications that the verdict must be construed with 
reference to the pleadings, evidence and instructions to the 
jury, and that as the :first action, based on the theory of 
respondeat superior and the negligence of Martin, the servant, 
had only Robert as the plaintiff, and the second, based on 
the theory of negligence in supervision, had as plaintiffs both 
Robert and his mother, the jury, in :finding for both the 
student and his mother, must have based its verdict on the 
latter theory. The rule is, however, that the silence as to one 
defendant stands as no verdict as to him unless the instruc-
tions to the jury show a contrary meaning. It has been held 
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that the pleadings and evidence must also be examined. (See 
Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra; Irelan-Yuba etc. 
Min. Co. v.Pacific G. & E., supra.) [6] But here the instruc-
tions and forms of verdict given to the jury are not in the rec-
ord. We must presume, therefore, that they were proper, and 
under the issues so presented, a proper verdict was returned 
(Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446 [31 P.2d 198].) [7a] It 
must be observed in this connection, and also in connection 
with the form of verdict in favor of Robert and his mother, 
that in the first action, the one based on respondeat superior 
and the negligence of Martin, while the mother was not named 
formally as a party, she appeared formally therein as the 
guardian ad litem of Robert, and she alleged therein, that as 
such guardian, she incurred hospital and medical expenses, 
and in the prayer, such expenses are claimed. The same was 
done in the second action, based on lack of supervision by 
the school, except she appears formally as plaintiff. In either 
case, she, for herself, was not entitled to recover any more than 
those expenses. The only reasonable conclusion is, therefore, 
that the jury, in returning a verdict in favor of both her and 
her son, included her merely because of such medical expenses. 
We cannot presume error in the verdict by speculating 
that both were included in the verdict because both were 
formally named in the second action and that it was predicated 
upon the theory of that action. We cannot suppose that the 
jury indulged in any such finespun legal theories or even 
knew that the mother was a formal party in one action and 
not the other. On the contrary, not having the instruc-
tions or forms of verdict before us, we must assume that she 
was treated by them as a plaintiff in both actions, and that the 
jury was told that she was entitled to hospital expenses in-
curred on behalf of Robert, if Martin was negligent in driv-
ing the car, and that such a verdict was proper. [8] Inso-
far as the verdict might be questioned for failing to segregate 
the amount awarded to the mother for medical expenses from 
that awarded to Robert for personal injuries, it does not ap-
pear that any objection was made to the form of verdict; it 
was, therefore, waived. (Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519 [75 
P.2d 1063].) 
[7b] Moreover, throughout the trial the mother was treated 
as a plaintiff without regard to which action was involved. 
The actions were tried as one action. Defendants' counsel 
in his motion for a nonsuit referred to the two actions as one 
in which two causes of action were stated, one on each theory 
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-respondeat superior and negligence in supervision. Cer-
tainly that is tantamount to treating the mother as a plaintiff 
under both theories or actions. Furthermore, a motion 
for a new trial was made on the same ground (impropriety 
of the verdict) and was denied. The trial court's conclusion, 
knowing the jury instructions and the trial proceedings, must 
be given great weight. (See Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446 
[31 P.2d 198].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It appears to me that on the 
record in this case the verdict cannot be sustained upon any 
theory of liability, and that the judgment should be reversed. 
As related in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Carter, 
two actions were :filed. In the :first action (No. 528375) the 
student as the sole party plaintiff sued the school and Martin 
(the driver of the automobile in which the student was riding 
when injured). In the second action (No. 540614) the stu-
dent and his mother, as parties plaintiff, sued the school only 
(on the theory of negligence or breach of contract in letting 
the student leave the school premises). The jury returned 
a verdict in favor of the student and his mother against the 
school only. This verdict :fits precisely the pleadings of the 
second action; as to the parties plaintiff and as to the party 
defendant in that action it resolves all the issues. It does 
not fit and does not appear to be responsive to the pleadings, 
parties or issues of the :first action. It seems to me that the 
only reasonable conclusion is that the verdict is based solely 
on the theory of the second action (No. 540614). 
I think that on close analysis even the argument in Justice 
Carter's opinion tends to support the above stated view rather 
than the conclusion reached by him. He says (after men-
tioning the cases holding that the pleadings and evidence must 
be examined, as well as the instructions to the jury, in deter-
mining the significance of a verdict as to one defendant and 
its silence as to another) : ''But here the instructions and 
forms of verdict given to the jury are not in the record. We 
must presume, therefore, that they were proper, and under 
the issues so presented, a proper verdict was returned. (Snod-
grass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446 [31 P.2d 198] .) " Applying that 
quoted principle to the case here we should presume that 
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"under the issues so presented, a proper verdict was re-
turned.'' The verdict which the jury returned is legally 
''proper'' in respect to the parties and the issues of the second 
action; it is in favor of the two plaintiffs named in that action 
and against the sole defendant. It is my firm conviction that 
the evidence (which it would serve no useful purpose to elab-
orate here) is not sufficient to support a verdict in that action; 
it wholly fails to establish the breach of any duty owed by 
defendants. 
Moreover, the superior court clerk's file in these cases has 
been forwarded to this court. Further supporting the view 
I have just expressed is the fact that the following instruc-
tion was given : 
''If you find from the evidence that all of the defendants 
in this action were guilty of negligence which proximately 
cause the injuries received by the plaintiff Robert Brokaw 
then your verdict must be for the plaintiffs against all of said 
defendants.'' 
If we are to presume that the jury followed the instruction 
-and we certainly have no right to presume otherwise-it 
seems to me that we must conclude that the jury did not find 
Martin guilty of negligence and could not have found Black-
Foxe guilty of negligence on the theory of respondeat supe-
rior because of any act or omission of Martin's. 
Even if this court could assume that by consolidating the 
actions for trial it was intended to so amend the pleadings 
as to include the mother as a party plaintiff in the first action 
(No. 528375), and that the failure to find against Martin has 
no significance, the most that can be said in favor of plaintiffs-
respondents is that it is impossible to tell, then, upon which 
theory the verdict is based; and since the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support a verdict based upon the theory advanced in 
the second action (No. 540614), the judgment cannot be sus-
tained. I would therefore reverse it. 
